“The doctrine of presumed undue influence is now very well settled and ought to be well understood.”1 Unfortunately, despite this confident assertion by Sir Martin Nourse in the recent Court of Appeal decision in Hammond v. Osborn, it is apparent that neither declaration is correct. Hammond concerned the application of undue influence within the very traditional context of a generous gift between persons bound by a relationship of trust and confidence. The central issue in this case was how, having raised a presumption of undue influence, it may be rebutted. The answer to this question, which was not directly addresed by the seminal House of Lords’ decision in Etridge (No. 2), 2 in effect defines the essence of presumed undue influence and delineates its parameters within the wider matrix of equitable protection of the vulnerable. Regrettably, the consequent conceptualization of presumed undue influence which resulted from the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Hammond differs significantly from that which was articulated by the House of Lords in Etridge (No. 2) . In many ways, this discrepancy illustrates that the original debate as to whether presumed undue influence is claimant (impaired consent) focused or defendant (unconscionable conduct) focused has yet to be resolved.3 Responsibility for this uncertainty lies in part with the House of Lords’ decision in Etridge (No. 2) . Whilst clearly favouring a defendant (unconscionable conduct) basis for presumed undue influence,4 the House of Lords failed to address directly a long line of claimant (impaired consent) based

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